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Abstract 
Globalization here is understood to be a multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform, 
and multicausal process, which has much less of an explanans and more of an 
explanandum. In recent analysis globalization has been found to be about place, space, and 
scale. Yet, following its title, this paper argues that it is about time too. In other words, 
globalization is also a spatio-temporal process. The nature of this process, its relation with 
the development of capitalist economies and the role of the state, are at the core of this 
paper.  
 
Zusammenfassung 
Globalisierung wird hier als Prozess verstanden mit vielfältigen Ursachen und 
Ausprägungen, mit zeitlichen und räumlichen Aspekten sowie einer polyzentrischen Natur. 
Dabei wird Globalisierung weniger als erklärendes, sondern vielmehr als zu erklärendes 
Phänomen gedeutet. In der gegenwärtigen sozialwissenschaftlichen Analyse wird 
Globalisierung in Zusammenhang mit örtlichen, räumlichen und skalaren Veränderungen 
gebracht. Wie der Titel dieses Papiers aber andeutet, handelt es sich ebenso um ein 
zeitbezogenes Phänomen: Globalisierung wird somit als räumlich-zeitlicher Prozess 
verstanden. Die Natur dieses Prozesses, seine Verbindungen mit der Entwicklung 
kapitalistischer Ökonomien und die Rolle des Staates werden im Fokus dieser Arbeit stehen. 
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The title of this paper involves a deliberate play on words. It is also meant to make some 
serious theoretical and political points about the nature of globalization. It is certainly not 
about time that we begin to talk of globalization. On the contrary, the time is now well past 
when it first began to be seriously questioned. Indeed, for many commentators, it is high time 
that the concept of globalization was banned. Nor does the title indicate that strategies to 
promote globalization are overdue and that it is about time that the globalization project was 
taken further. Instead the title is intended to suggest that it is high time that we recognized – 
both theoretically and politically – that globalization is not just about place, space, and scale. 
It is about time too. Globalization is a phenomenon of a ‘runaway world,’ of the annihilation of 
distance by time, of the increasing acceleration of social events and processes. And, to go 
further, it is a phenomenon that causes problems as much, if not more, because of its 
complex temporalities as it does because of its complex spatialities. In short, if we are to 
understand and control globalization, it is about time that we realized that it is a spatio-
temporal process. 
In developing this argument, I first critique some recent simplified ideas about globalization, 
insisting on its many complexities and suggesting that the concept of globalization would be 
better seen as an explanandum than as an explanans. Second, building on the multicentric, 
multiscalar, and multitemporal features of globalization as well as the notions of time-space 
distantiation and time-space compression, I argue that the spatial turn involved in many 
recent discussions of globalization has been overdone and that it is time to combine it with a 
temporal (re)turn that can do justice to the complex spatio-temporalities of globalization. I 
illustrate this argument from Marx’s work on the political economy of capitalism and, 
especially, his analysis of the spatio-temporal dynamics that are generated by its 
organization as an economy of time. Third, in this context I introduce the concept of 
spacetime and spatio-temporal fixes and draw out some of the theoretical implications of 
such fixes for understanding the nature and problems of globalization. Fourth, I explore 
some of the temporal contradictions of the current globalizing phase of a post-Fordist, 
knowledge-based capitalism. Fifth, in the light of these remarks, I consider the implications of 
globalization for the national state, noting in particular the challenges to its temporal 
sovereignty. Here I consider the politics of time involved in globalization, the ways in which 
this challenges the national sovereign state and the practices of democratic politics, and then 
suggest some ways to address the acceleration of economic processes associated with the 
current wave of globalization. My reflections conclude with some general remarks on the 
importance of temporality to an understanding and critique of globalization. 
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1. Globalization 
‘Globalization’ is a polyvalent, promiscuous, controversial word that often obscures more 
than it reveals about recent economic, political, social, and cultural changes. It is best used 
to denote a multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform, and multicausal process.  
First, it is multicentric because it emerges from activities in many places rather than from a 
single centre. It cannot be reduced to Americanization, as some critics of American 
imperialism suggest, but emanates from many sites around the globe. Moreover, even if one 
were to insist against the evidence that it was primarily an American-initiated phenomenon, it 
would still be necessary to recognize the plurality of globalization processes and effects 
depending on whether one looked at American influences emanating from New York as a 
financial centre, Washington as an imperial city, Atlanta as a global news factory, Hollywood 
as an entertainment capital, Silicon Valley as the centre of informational capitalism, and so 
on. The same point would apply, of course, to the alleged centrality of other national 
formations.  
Second, globalization is multiscalar because it emerges from actions on many scales – 
which can no longer be seen as nested in a neat hierarchy but as co-existing and 
interpenetrating in a tangled and confused manner – and it develops and deepens the scalar 
as well as the spatial division of labour. This excludes any simple opposition between the 
global and the national or the global and the local. Indeed, in some ways, the global is little 
more than ‘a hugely extended network of localities’ (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996: 22). More 
generally, what could be described from one vantagepoint as globalization might be re-
described (and, perhaps, more accurately) in rather different terms from one or more 
alternative scalar viewpoints: for example, as internationalization, triadization, regional bloc 
formation, global city network-building, cross-border region formation, international 
localization, glocalization, glurbanization, or transnationalization. For, regardless of their own 
distinctive dynamics, if any, each of these scalar processes is also linked more or less 
closely into the overall dynamic of globalization – whether as modifying, counteracting, or 
reinforcing processes. 
Third, the latter dynamic is multitemporal because it involves an ever more complex 
restructuring and re-articulation of temporalities and time horizons. This aspect is captured in 
the notions of time-space distantiation and time-space compression. The former process 
involves the stretching of social relations over time and space so that relations can be 
controlled or co-ordinated over longer periods of time (including the ever more distant future) 
and longer distances, greater areas, or more scales of activity. The ultimate spatial horizon of 
time-space distantiation is, of course, total control over social relations on a fully integrated 
global scale into the foreseeable future. There are good reasons, however, to regard this 
ultimate horizon as implausible. The latter process involves the intensification of ‘discrete’ 
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events in real time and/or the increased velocity of material and immaterial flows over a 
given distance. This is also a significant (and also incompletely developed) aspect of 
globalization and, indeed, it is time-space compression more than time-space distantiation 
that is more distinctive of the most recent wave of globalization. If we examine the interaction 
between these two processes, it becomes evident that much of the fascination with 
globalization is rooted in the increased significance of social forces and processes that 
combine capacities for time-space distantiation and compression: the most obvious (in the 
sense of most cited) case is hypermobile financial capital that can circulate globally in real 
time. But focusing on such cases ignores the significance of other forces and processes that 
are located elsewhere in the two-dimensional property space that can be derived from using 
degrees of time-space distantiation and time-space compression as its respective horizontal 
and vertical axes. 
Fourth, globalization is multiform. It assumes different forms in different contexts and can be 
realized through different strategies – neo-liberal globalization with its emphasis on the 
integration of the world market along neo-liberal lines is only one of these general forms and 
even this having several significant variants. Once one allows for other forms of 
technological and economic globalization and other sites and processes of globalization 
across different functional systems and the lifeworld (or civil society), then the multiformity of 
globalization appears even more strongly. 
Finally, globalization is clearly multicausal because it results from the complex, contingent 
interaction of many different causal processes. For, taken together, the preceding features 
mean that, far from globalization being a unitary causal mechanism, it should be understood 
as the complex, emergent product of many different forces operating on many scales. Hence 
nothing can be explained in terms of the causal powers of globalization – let alone causal 
powers that are inevitable and irreversible and that are actualized on some intangible stage 
behind our backs or on some intangible plane above our heads. Instead globalizations 
themselves need explaining in all their manifold spatio-temporal complexity. This does not 
exclude specific hypotheses about the impact of clearly specifiable processes on particular 
sets of social relations. Thus one might be able to investigate the extent to which the 
increasing hypermobility of financial capital affects the capacities of national states to set real 
interest rates to secure full employment levels of demand. But one could not meaningfully 
investigate the wild and overgeneral claim that "globalization undermines the power of the 
state.” This point highlights the more general point about the multicentric, multiscalar, 
multitemporal, and multiform nature of globalization. Moreover, once we understand how 
globalizing processes are generated and how they operate, we can better intervene in their 
production and better resist some of their effects. 
In spite of these arguments, it is still possible and worthwhile to reflect on the nature of 
globalization. But we must define globalization with all due caution and in ways that allow for 
the above-mentioned complexities. Thus I would propose here that globalization has both 
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structural and strategic moments. Structurally, it involves the objective processes whereby 
increasing global interdependence is created among actions, organizations, and institutions 
within (but not necessarily across) different functional systems (economy, law, politics, 
education, science, sport, etc.) and the lifeworld that lies beyond them. These processes 
occur on various spatial scales, operate differently in each functional subsystem, involve 
complex and tangled causal hierarchies rather than a simple, unilinear, bottom-up or top-
down movement, and often display an eccentric ‘nesting’ of the different scales of social 
organization. They also develop unevenly in spacetime. Nonetheless, globalization can be 
said to increase insofar as the co-variation of actions, events, and institutional orders 
involves more (and more important) relevant activities, is spatially more extensive, and 
occurs more rapidly.  
Strategically, globalization refers to conscious attempts to promote global co-ordination of 
activities in (but not necessarily across) different functional subsystems and/or in the 
lifeworld. This does not require that the actors involved are physically present at all points in 
the planet but only requires them to monitor relevant activities, communicate about these, 
and try to co-ordinate their activities with others to produce global effects. Such co-ordination 
efforts range from generalized meta-steering (constitutional or institutional design) intended 
to produce a more or less comprehensive global order through creation of international 
regimes to particularistic pursuit of specific economic-corporate interests within such (meta-) 
frameworks. There is clearly scope for wide variation here as shown by the neo-liberal, 
market-led globalization promoted by the World Bank, the horizontal ‘global governance’ 
favoured by proponents (especially NGOs) of democratic international regimes, and plans for 
more top-down inter-statal government. Not all actors are (or could hope to be) major global 
players but many more have to monitor the global as a horizon of action, the implications of 
changing scalar divisions, and the impact of time-space distantiation and compression on 
their identities, interests, and strategies. The overall course of globalization will be the largely 
unintended, relatively chaotic outcome of interaction among various strategies to shape or 
resist globalization in a complex, path-dependent world society. It follows that any account of 
globalization is likely to be partial and incomplete, exaggerating some features, missing 
others, and risking neglect of events and processes on other scales. 
Globalization is part of a proliferation of scales and temporalities as narrated, institutionalized 
objects of action, regularization, and governance. The number of scales and temporalities of 
action that can be distinguished is immense but far fewer ever get explicitly institutionalized. 
How far this happens depends on the prevailing technologies of power – material, social, 
and spatio-temporal – that enable the identification and institutionalization of specific scales 
of action and temporalities. It is the development of new logistical means (of distantiation, 
compression, communication), organizational technologies, institutions with new spatio-
temporal horizons of action, broader institutional architectures, new global standards 
(including world time), and modes of governance that helps to explain this growing 
proliferation of economically and politically significant institutionalized scales and 
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temporalities. Moreover, as new scales and temporalities emerge and/or existing ones gain 
in institutional thickness, social forces also tend to develop new mechanisms to link or co-
ordinate them. This in turn often prompts efforts to co-ordinate these new co-ordination 
mechanisms. Thus, as the triad regions begin to acquire institutional form and identity, new 
forums develop to co-ordinate their bilateral relations. Likewise, as regionalism develops in 
the European Union, we find not only an EU-wide Committee of the Regions but also a 
proliferation of other peak associations and multilateral linkages among regions. Even further 
down the scale, local authorities develop associations to promote their interests at national, 
regional, international, and global levels. All of this produces increasing scalar complexity, 
increasing scope for deliberate interscalar articulation, and increasing problems in making 
such interscalar articulation work. Similar issues occur in relation to time and its governance. 
This can be seen in the rise of nano-temporalities at the micro-level and long-term action to 
ensure environmental sustainability at the macro-level. And this leads in turn to growing 
problems of intertemporal governance. 
2. Globalization and the Spatial Turn 
Commentators often portray globalization as one of the driving forces in the ‘spatial turn’ in 
the social sciences and/or as one of its most important products. For, insofar as globalization 
appears to be an essentially spatial phenomenon, it allegedly demands an approach that is 
sensitive to issues of space, place, and scale. Moreover, when we approach globalization in 
such terms, this often changes how other issues are seen. The spatial turn can be thematic, 
methodological, or both (cf. Jessop 2001). In the first sense it involves thematizing 
intrinsically spatial issues as objects of analysis. This sort of turn is hardly controversial 
provided that it does not lead to a fetishistic naturalization of space, place, and scale or to 
the belief that space, place, and scale have their own autonomous properties regardless of 
their social constitution and reproduction and regardless of their articulation with other 
moments of social relations. In the second sense, the spatial turn involves an investigation of 
more complex issues by using their spatial moments as an entry point, without this requiring 
that the investigation does not proceed beyond the spatial. In either case, the spatial turn 
could involve little more than an innocent, belated, and welcome recognition that space 
matters in one or more ways; but it could also involve the belief that an earlier interest in time 
and temporal issues was mistaken, overdone, or at best misleading. In short, there is a risk 
that the spatial turn is seen as a simple alternative to a focus on temporality. What is really 
required is a discussion of spatio-temporality rather than implying that there is a choice 
between them. 
The ability to integrate the spatial and temporal aspects of globalization is evident in Marx’s 
critique of political economy and his analysis of capitalism in terms of an economy of time. 
The key point here is that the spatial dynamic of capitalism can be derived in the first 
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instance from the competition among capitalists to reduce socially necessary labour time as 
well as the total time involved in production. Marx showed that individual capitals are subject 
to competitive pressure to reduce production, circulation, and turnover times. They also face 
pressure to innovate in other ways that may affect the spatial and scalar divisions of labour. 
In this sense, although place and space are certainly regarded as a basic material 
presupposition of all social activities, their entry into Marx’s analysis as major variables come 
much later in the course of his analysis. They are first seriously introduced in terms of 
particular capitals rather than capital in general; in terms of turnover time rather than 
production time; and in the context of use-value (e.g., transportation) rather than that of 
value or exchange-value (de la Haye 1988). This spatial reorganization was as prone to 
contradictions, however, as any feature of capital as a social relation. For our purposes, this 
implies, of course, that globalization is also contradictory and will have its limits. 
These points about Marx’s analysis of time and space are worth making because contrasting 
views have been expressed about their relative primacy in capitalism. It has been suggested 
that capital’s concern with the production of value leads to an emphasis on increasing the 
socially necessary labour time embodied in commodities (the time of labour); that its concern 
with the production of surplus value leads to an emphasis on control over space and the 
importance of constructing and reconstructing space relations and the global space 
economy; that its concern with profits leads to an emphasis on reducing the socially 
necessary turnover time of circulating capital and that this is often associated with command 
over space (means of communication and transportation) as well as organizational 
innovations; that its concern with social use-value is associated with an emphasis on the 
spatial relations that determine the usefulness of particular goods and services and/or on the 
time and/or timing of the delivery of goods and services; and, finally, those who take class 
struggle as their entry point (especially the struggles of subordinate classes) tend to focus on 
place and space. For, as Soja comments, class struggle ‘must encompass and focus upon 
the vulnerable point: the production of space, the territorial structure of exploitation and 
domination, the spatially controlled reproduction of the system as a whole’ (Soja 1989: 92). 
Such contrasting opinions are not so much signs of intellectual incoherence as expressions 
of basic contradictions in capitalism itself. This is reflected in the contrast between the 
mobility of abstract money capital in a space of flows and the commodified production and 
consumption of specific use-values in specific times and places. Yet even this contrast is 
only ever tendential and relative, for ‘in every instance when we accentuate space or time, 
the other aspect is still present, although hidden’ (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996: 21). Thus 
the mobility of abstract money capital in a space of flows depends on the development of the 
sort of fixed technical and social infrastructures that characterize the emerging network of 
global cities. And the production and consumption of specific use-values involves a spatial 
and scalar division of labour which must also be co-ordinated across different time scales 
(e.g., associated with different production cycles, different ratios of fixed to circulating capital, 
and different degrees of durability of goods and services destined for private consumption). 
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There are also ‘contradictory movements in which time is simultaneously compressed and 
expanded, depending on which part of the system one examines, so that the general 
progression is uneven and punctuated by more or less significant reverses’ (Schoenberger 
1997: 19). This suggests the need to make a thematic and methodological temporal  (re)turn 
to redress one-sided concern with space in studies of globalization. Interestingly, just such a 
temporal (re)turn can be seen in a growing recognition of the need to bring time (back) into 
the analysis of globalization among those who had previously privileged the spatial. 
3. On Spatio-Temporal Fixes and the  
Contradictions of Capitalism 
Here I want to argue that the reproduction and regularization of capital as a social relation 
involves a social fix (complex mode of regularization) that compensates for the inherent 
incompleteness of the pure capital relation, i.e., its inability to secure the conditions for the 
continued expansion of capital accumulation purely in and through the operation of profit-
oriented, market-mediated economic forces. This social fix is always time-and-place specific 
and gives a specific dynamic to capital accumulation through its distinctive, historically 
variable, and inherently unstable articulation of economic and extra-economic elements. The 
importance of these extra-economic elements is widely recognized, of course, in very 
different social scientific literatures (Smithian, Marxian, Weberian, Durkheimian, liberal and 
neo-liberal, institutionalist, etc). But there is also widespread disagreement about its 
implications. On my reading, this social fix helps to secure a relatively durable structural 
coherence in managing the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the capital relation so 
that different forms, institutions, and practices tend to be mutually reinforcing. This includes 
the imposition on these economic and extra-economic elements of a distinctive spatio-
temporal fix. 
Structurally, these spatio-temporal fixes emerge when an accumulation regime and its 
complex mode of regularization co-evolve to produce a certain structural coherence within a 
given spatio-temporal framework but not beyond it. This is typically associated with a 
distinctive hierarchy of the various structural or institutional forms of capitalism that thereby 
affects their interactions within the institutional architecture as a whole and shapes the 
overall logic of the spatio-temporal fix. This hierarchy involves giving greater priority to the 
regularizing of some structural forms (and giving greater priority, perhaps, to one or other 
aspect of their associated contradictions and dilemmas) than to other structural forms. These 
priorities will vary with accumulation regimes, modes of growth, and governance capacities. 
In the Atlantic Fordism associated with the thirty years of postwar economic expansion in 
most advanced capitalist economies, for example, the wage and money forms were the 
principal structural forms at the heart of the mode of regularization. In constrast, in the 
emerging post-Fordist regime based on a globalizing knowledge-based economy, other 
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forms have become more important and, indeed, critical to the eventual consolidation of a 
new accumulation regime and mode of regularization. These are the forms of competition 
and the institutional forms and functions of the state. Or, again, while liberal market 
economies may give more weight to labour-power as a substitutable factor of production and 
to the wage as a cost of production, more co-ordinated capitalist economies may prioritize 
labour-power in its guise as human capital (sic) and the wage as a source of demand. 
Strategically, because capitalism’s contradictions and dilemmas are insoluble in the abstract, 
they are resolved – partially and provisionally, if at all – through the formulation-realization of 
specific accumulation strategies at various economic and political scales in specific spatio-
temporal contexts.  
Such spatio-temporal fixes delimit the main spatial and temporal boundaries within which 
structural coherence is secured, and externalize certain costs of securing this coherence 
beyond these boundaries. Even within these boundaries some classes, class fractions, 
social categories or other social forces located inside these spatio-temporal boundaries are 
marginalized, excluded, or oppressed. Thus, spatio-temporal fixes also facilitate the 
institutionalized compromises on which accumulation regimes and modes of regulation 
depend, and subsequently come to embody them. This can involve super-exploitation of 
internal or external spaces outside the compromise, super-exploitation of nature or inherited 
social resources, deferral of problems into an indefinite future and, of course, the exploitation 
and/or oppression of specific classes, strata or other social categories. 
Nonetheless, insofar as such compromises marginalize forces that act as bearers of 
functions or operations essential to long-run accumulation, the growth of significant 
imbalances, disproportionalities or disunity in the circuit of capital will tend to strengthen the 
hand of these forces, enabling them to disrupt the institutionalized compromises involved in 
a particular accumulation regime, mode of regulation, state form and spatio-temporal fix (cf. 
Clarke 1977). Such crises typically act as a steering mechanism for the always provisional, 
partial and unstable re-equilibration of capital accumulation insofar as they prompt attempts 
to guide the forcible reimposition of the unity of the circuit of capital through new 
accumulation strategies and modes of regulation. 
The primary scales and temporal horizons around which such fixes are built and the extent 
of their coherence vary considerably over time. This is reflected in the variable coincidence 
of different boundaries, borders or frontiers of action and the changing primacy of different 
scales. Political boundaries, for example, have been characterized by medieval polymorphy, 
Westphalian exclusivity, and post-Westphalian complexity. Likewise, the consolidation of 
capitalism witnessed the national eclipse of the urban scale as cities were integrated into 
national economic systems and subordinated to the political power of national territorial 
states. And the national scale has since been challenged by the rise of global city networks 
more oriented to other global cities than to national hinterlands.  
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These ideas have important implications for accumulation strategies, state projects, and 
hegemonic projects on various scales of action and over different time horizons. For each of 
these involves an attempt to strategically co-ordinate activities across different systems and 
the lifeworld in order to achieve a limited, localized structural coherence in accumulation, 
state activities and social formations respectively. There is ample scope for competition 
among social forces over accumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic visions as 
well as for potential disjunctions between the strategies that emerge from such competition 
to dominate their respective imagined spheres. In this context a key role is played by the 
rivalries and struggles of intellectual forces, individually and collectively, in a free-floating or 
an organized manner, to articulate strategies, projects and visions that seek to reconcile 
contradictions and conflicts and to resolve dilemmas for various sites and scales of action 
(cf. Gramsci 1971). The principal forces involved in these rivalries and struggles are 
organized interests, political parties, and social movements with the mass media rather than 
the public sphere now having a central position in the mediation of the struggle for 
hegemony in these matters. 
As part of a given spatio-temporal fix, different institutions, apparatuses or agencies may 
specialize primarily in one or other horn of a dilemma, deal with it over different temporal 
horizons, or address different aspects at different times. The state may also alter the balance 
between institutions, apparatuses and agencies by reallocating responsibilities and 
resources, allowing them to compete for political support and legitimacy as circumstances 
change, etc. Such strategies may be pursued entirely within the state or extend to the 
division between state and non-state modes of governance. Another way to manage 
potential problems arising from the limits of different modes of policy-making or crisis-
management is through variable policy emphases across different scales of action and 
temporal horizons. For example, in Atlantic Fordism, the national state set the 
macroeconomic framework, the local state acted as its relay for many nationally-determined 
policies, and intergovernmental cooperation in various international regimes maintained the 
conditions for national economic growth. Likewise, in contemporary neoliberal accumulation 
regimes, a relative neglect of substantive (as opposed to formal) supply-side conditions at 
the international and national levels in favour of capital flows in and through space is partly 
compensated by more interventionist policies at the regional, urban and local levels, where 
many material interdependencies among specific productive capitals are located (Gough and 
Eisenschitz 1996). This helps explain why local states are being reorganized as new forms of 
local or regional partnership emerge to guide and promote the development of local or 
regional resources. 
Another example of spatial-scalar divisions of labour is the distinction between foreign and 
domestic relations inherent in the modern state system such that some parts of the state 
apparatus specialize in external relations, some in internal relations. However, with the 
growing impact of globalization and new forms of competitiveness, inherited divisions of 
state labour change. Thus, not only is the distinction between domestic and foreign policy 
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becoming blurred; but subnational governments are now getting engaged in foreign 
(economic) policy through cross-border cooperation, international localization, and so on, at 
the same time as supranational bodies get involved in the redesign and reorientation of 
subnational politics.  
There can also be a temporal division of labour with different institutions, apparatuses or 
agencies responding to contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes over different time 
horizons. This is reflected in the conventional distinction between planning and execution 
within organizations and in the primacy of different temporal horizons across organizations 
(for example, banks and central banks, computer-programmed arbitrage funds and long-term 
venture capital funds). Similarly, corporatist arrangements have often been established to 
address long-term economic and social issues where complex, reciprocal interdependence 
requires long-term cooperation – thereby taking the relevant policy areas outside the short-
term time horizons of electoral cycles and parliamentary in-fighting. In both cases there is 
scope for activities to rebalance relations among these institutions, apparatuses or agencies 
through differential allocation of resources; allowing them to compete for legitimacy in 
changing circumstances. 
4. Spatio-Temporal Contradictions in  
Contemporary Capitalism 
The multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform, and multicausal processes associated 
with globalization enhance capital’s capacity to defer and displace its internal contradictions, 
if not to resolve them, by increasing the scope of its operations on a global scale, by 
reinforcing its capacities to disembed certain of its operations from local material, social, and 
spatio-temporal constraints, by enabling it to deepen the spatial and scalar divisions of 
labour, by creating more opportunities for moving up, down, and across scales, by 
commodifying and securitizing the future, by deferring past and present material problems 
into the future, by promoting long-term technology forecasting, organizational learning, and 
trust building, and by re-articulating different time horizons. These enhanced capacities can 
markedly reinforce tendencies to uneven development as the search continues for new 
spatio-temporal displacements and new spatio-temporal fixes. Above all, globalization helps 
to emancipate the exchange-value moment of capital from extra-economic and spatio-
temporal constraints, increases the emphasis on speed, acceleration, and turnover time, and 
enhances capital’s capacity to escape the control of other systems insofar as these are still 
territorially differentiated and fragmented. 1 This is linked to its increased capacity for 
discounting events (so collapsing the future into the present), its increased capacity for time-
                                                 
1  Conversely, the growth of global legal and political systems and other international regimes means that mobile 
capital will remain subject to their constraints. 
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space compression, its resort to complex derivative trading to manage risk, and its capacities 
to jump scale. Finally, globalization weakens the capacity of national states to guide capital’s 
expansion within a framework of national security (as reflected in the ‘national security 
state’), national welfare (as reflected in social democratic welfare states), or some other 
national project with a corresponding spatio-temporal fix. And, conversely, it increases the 
pressures on national states to adjust to the time horizons and temporalities of mobile capital 
able to operate beyond their frontiers. 
In short, the development of a globalizing capitalism typically intensifies the spatio-temporal 
contradictions and tensions inherent in the capital relation and/or its articulation and co-
evolution with the spatialities and temporalities of the natural and social world beyond the 
sphere of value relations. The increasing emphasis on speed and the growing acceleration 
of social life is particularly disruptive and disorienting (see Virilio 1994; 1998). Here I want to 
note five tensions or contradictions it introduces into the globalizing economy. These are not 
engendered by globalization as such; my approach to globalization rules this out. But they 
are tensions or contradictions that become more severe with the increasing organizational 
and spatio-temporal complexity and flexibility in the circuits of capital associated with 
globalization. 
First, there is a tension between the complex, reciprocally interdependent substantive 
reproduction requirements of real natural, social, and cultural processes and the simplified, 
one-sided, monetized temporalities involved in capital’s emphasis on exchange-value. 
Globalization reinforces this tension by making it easier for capital to destroy the local 
bounties of first and second nature and then move on without regard to their long-term 
reproduction. Indeed, the growing emphasis on artificial short-term profit means that, ‘as 
capital speeds up, it diminishes or degrades the conditions of the natural reproduction of 
natural things’ (Brennan 1995: 31).  
Second, there is a tension among the many and varied substantive temporalities of human 
existence (biological, sentient, sociocultural, self-reflexive) and the abstract time inherent in 
the commodification of labour power and the dominance of formal market rationality (Stahel 
1999: 108; see also Polanyi 1944). This is reflected in the stresses of everyday life and in a 
growing sense of time-space compression.  
Third, contemporary capitalism involves a paradox that ‘(t)he most advanced economies 
function more and more in terms of the extra-economic’ (Veltz 1996: 12). This rests on the 
increasing interdependence between economic and extra-economic factors making for 
structural competitiveness. This is linked to the growth of new technologies based on more 
complex transnational, national, and regional systems of innovation, to the paradigm shift 
from Fordism with its emphasis on productivity growth rooted in economies of scale to post-
Fordism with its emphasis on mobilising social as well as economic sources of flexibility and 
entrepreneurialism, and to the more general attempts to penetrate micro-social relations in 
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the interests of valorization. It is reflected in the emphasis now given to social capital, trust, 
and communities of learning as well as to the competitive role of entrepreneurial cities, 
enterprise culture, and enterprising subjects. This paradox generates a major contradiction 
between short-term economic calculation (especially in financial flows) and the long-term 
dynamic of ‘real competition’ rooted in resources (skills, trust, heightened reflexivity, 
collective mastery of techniques, economies of agglomeration and size) that may take years 
to create, stabilize, and reproduce. Likewise, spatially, there is a basic contradiction between 
the economy seen as a de-territorialized, socially disembedded space of flows and as a 
territorially rooted, socially embedded system of extra-economic as well as economic 
resources, competencies, and activities (Storper 1997). The latter moment is reflected in 
wide range of new concepts to describe the knowledge-driven economy – national, regional, 
and local systems of innovation, innovative milieus, systemic or structural competitiveness, 
learning regions, social capital, trust, learning-by-doing, speed-based competition, etc. This 
poses new dilemmas for the stabilization of the capital relation over more scales and over 
increasingly compressed as well as extended temporal horizons of action.  
Fourth, temporally, there is a tension between the drive to accelerate the circulation of capital 
by shortening the production cycle between design and final consumption and the long-term 
infrastructural development on which this depends. In this context, Harvey notes that ‘[I]t 
takes a specific organization of space to try and annihilate space and it takes capital of long 
turnover time to facilitate the more rapid turnover of the rest. But the reduction of spatial 
barriers has an equally powerful opposite effect; small-scale and finely graded differences 
between the qualities of places (their labor supply, their infrastructures, and political 
receptivity, their resource mixes, their market niches, etc.) become even more important 
because multinational capital is better able to exploit them. (1996a: 246–7). This set of 
contradictions is aggravated by the increasing capacity for temporal compression linked to 
the latest ICT developments, which distresses many other fractions of capital and puts 
pressure on the state and other less mobile social forces. 
Fifth, spatially, there is a tension between extending the scope of markets through the 
annihilation of space by time and the need for fixed infrastructure to enable rapid movement 
through space (which must be destroyed in turn as the next round of accumulation develops) 
(Harvey 1996b: 6). This contradiction may be aggravated by the expansion of production 
through mechanization and scale economies. Because this requires larger markets, it 
extends the time of commodity circulation and may also extend the overall turnover time due 
to the higher proportion of fixed to total capital. It can also lead to a dialectic of spatial 
concentration (agglomeration economies) and dispersal (congestion, land prices, 
unionization, etc.) (Schoenberger 1997: 19–21).  
There are spiral processes at work in the last two contradictions that tend to increase the 
spatio-temporal complexities of regularizing and governing capital accumulation. ‘Every local 
decentralization presupposes a renewed form of centralization at a higher level. Every 
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temporal flexibilization requires, with increasing complexity, new mechanisms in order to hold 
the seemingly loosening temporal connections together. Flexibility becomes possible against 
the background of a previously unattained degree of constant temporal availability, as the 
prerequisite and consequence of which it functions’ (Nowotny 1994: 99). There are also 
oscillations in the relative importance of time and space. Thus, whereas mass production 
compressed time in production, it extended it in product life cycles to valorize dedicated fixed 
capital and allow for the unmanageability of time required for product development. Now the 
situation is reversed. The current emphasis is on speeding up product development times 
and order-to-delivery cycle. This also involves maximum flexibility in organization of 
production, economies of scope, etc. (Schoenberger 1997: 45).  
5. The Implications of Globalization for  
(National) States 
Much has been written on the implications of globalization for the possible demise of the 
national state and/or the national state’s importance for continuing globalization. Such 
commentaries have been plagued by false oppositions and assumptions. The first false 
opposition is posited most starkly as that between the state as a ‘power container’ that 
operates exclusively within defined territorial frontiers and the economy as a borderless 
exchange mechanism with no important territorial anchoring. This opposition commits four 
errors in its conception of the state and economy. First, states (and the social forces they 
represent) are actively involved in constituting and reconstituting the spatio-temporal 
matrices that organize politics, including its inter-state and international moments (Gross 
1985; Poulantzas 1978). Thus there is no reason to assume the fixity of its frontiers or 
temporal horizons. Second, as form-determined condensations of a changing balance of 
social forces, state apparatuses and state power will reflect the manifold processes that 
produce globalization. Thus the state apparatus may interiorize the interests of foreign 
capital as well as project the interests of national capital abroad (Poulantzas 1975, 1978). 
Third, the economy should not be reduced to a market-mediated space of flows operating in 
timeless time: markets also operate in accordance with other spatio-temporalities and the 
economy more generally involves various non-market governance mechanisms with yet 
other spatio-temporal dynamics. It follows that the regularization and governance of 
globalization involves many different scales and temporal horizons. And, fourth, the 
specificity of many economic assets and their embedding in extra-economic institutions 
mean that much economic activity remains place- and time-bound. Combining these 
objections, one could conclude that the state operates as a power connector, i.e., as a nodal 
or network state within a broader political system (Brunn 1999: 114), as well as a power 
container; and, likewise, that the economy has important territorial dimensions (reflected in 
concepts such as industrial districts, agglomeration economies, global cities, and regional or 
national capitalisms). Thus we should focus on the changing organization of politics and 
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economics and their respective institutional embodiments and see frontiers and borders as 
actively reproduced and contingent rather than as pregiven and fixed.  
Another false opposition involves treating the state as a political force and globalization as 
an economic process with the corollary that their relationship is zero-sum in nature. This 
ignores how states help to constitute the economy as an object of regulation and the extent 
to which even economic globalization continues to depend on politics. For the capital relation 
is constitutively incomplete and needs extra-economic supplementation if the inherently 
improbable process of accumulation is to continue. States are heavily involved in this 
supplementation both directly and through their modulation of other extra-economic modes 
of regulation; and their equally improbable capacity to achieve this depends in part on 
revenues and resources derived from the accumulation process. In short, state-economy 
relations inevitably involve reciprocal interdependence, prompt attempts at strategic co-
ordination, and produce structural coupling. It cannot be understood in zero-sum terms. 
Attempts to do so also ignore the complexities of globalization. Not only are many states 
actively involved in constituting the conditions for globalization, which is multiform and hence 
contested, but globalization is also linked to processes on other scales, such as 
regionalization, triadization, international localization, and cross-borderization, and states 
engage in promoting/resisting these processes too. Finally, zero-sum analyses ignore the 
extent to which the unfolding economic logic (and illogic) of globalization can constrain firms 
as well as political actors.  
This leads us to a third area of conceptual confusion: the claim that globalization puts 
pressure on the sovereign state. This is misleading for four reasons. First, sovereignty is only 
one aspect of the form of the modern state. As a specific juridico-political form, sovereignty 
certainly organizes key features of state power; but it is struggles over state power that are 
ultimately primary, not the particular forms in which it is exercised. Forms of sovereignty have 
been reorganized in the past and a post-sovereign international system is imaginable. 
Second, it is not the  State as such (sovereign or otherwise) that is pressured by 
globalization. The processes that generate globalization can only put pressure on particular 
forms of state with particular state capacities and liabilities, such as the Keynesian Welfare 
National State in Atlantic Fordism or the Listian Workfare National State in East Asian 
Exportism.2 In so doing, it also modifies the balance of forces within states. For any 
differential loss of capacities will favour some fractions, classes, and social forces over 
others; it also creates space for, and prompts, struggles to reorganize state forms and 
capacities. Important aspects of such pressures are the acceleration of economic decision-
making and temporal compression of significant economic events relative to the time 
required for considered political decision-making. This weakens what one might call the ‘time 
sovereignty’ of the state in its current form. Third, since globalization is not a single causal 
                                                 
2  On Listian Workfare National States and East Asian exportism, see Jessop (1999) and Sum (1998). 
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mechanism with a universal, unitary logic but is multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, and 
multiform, it does not generate a single, uniform set of pressures. All states and state 
capacities will be pressured by globalization but each will be affected in different ways. 
Indeed, while some states actively promote globalization, others can be seen as its victims. 
Thus, even if one agreed that globalization mainly means Americanization, the ‘Great Satan’ 
would still experience pressures emanating from other centres and forms of globalization as 
well as from the internal impact of its own neo-liberal form and the resistance it inevitably 
generates at home and abroad. Similar arguments hold for the differential impact of the 
multiscalar nature of globalization, with states being differentially involved in various scalar 
projects and processes; and about that of its multitemporal nature, with some states more 
actively involved in and/or more vulnerable to time-space distantiation and compression. 
And, fourth, we should note that some aspects of globalization might actually enhance rather 
than diminish state capacities.  
Having clarified possible misconceptions, we can now consider how (national) states are 
involved in, and affected, by globalization. In broad terms, states are actively engaged in 
redrawing the spatio-temporal matrices within which capital operates. In doing so, they are 
trying to manage the tension between potentially mobile capital’s interests in reducing its 
place-dependency and/or liberating itself from temporal constraints, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, their own interest in fixing (allegedly beneficial)3 capital within their own 
territories and rendering capital’s temporal horizons and rhythms compatible with their statal 
and/or political routines, temporalities, and crisis-tendencies. For, as globalization increases, 
national states can no longer presume, as they did in the heyday of Atlantic Fordism, that 
their primary economic task is to govern a relatively closed national economy – instead they 
are increasingly involved in managing a range of transnational processes and creating the 
spatial and temporal fixes appropriate thereto. Of particular importance here is the changing 
relationship between the economic and the extra-economic factors bearing on 
competitiveness and states’ own role in redefining the boundaries between the economic 
and extra-economic and/or reorganizing the latter and subordinating them to the perceived 
demands and pressures of globalization. Thus, to take a paradoxical example, even as neo-
liberal states seem to disengage from the market economy, they intervene more in the extra-
economic field and subordinate it to the demands of valorization.  
More generally, the activities of capitalist states, almost regardless of their specific form and 
projects, have been reshaping the spatio-temporal matrices of globalization. Their roles here 
reflect the balance of internal and external forces, with some more willing and active 
participants in these processes than others. Nonetheless, among many relevant activities, 
we can mention: deregulating, liberalizing, and shaping the institutional architecture of 
                                                 
3  Excluded here, for example, might be heavily polluting industries that may be encouraged to relocate – with 
their products being imported – rather than to undertake expensive environmental protection measures. 
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finance, facilitating thereby its accelerating internationalization and its global acceleration; 
modifying institutional frameworks for international trade and foreign direct investment; 
planning and subsidizing the spatial fixes that support the activities of financial, industrial, 
and commercial capital within and across borders; promoting uneven development through 
policies for inter-urban and inter-regional as well as international competition; cooperating in 
the rebordering and rescaling of state functions – including decentralization and cross-border 
region formation, regional bloc formation, and participating in forums for inter-triad 
negotiation; de-statizing current state functions by transferring them to private-public 
partnerships or place-bound market forces and thereby linking them to market-oriented 
temporalities; de-territorializing some state functions by transferring them to private forms of 
functional authority (including international regimes) and/or to mobile market forces; 
attempting, conversely, to fit some non-territorial problems into an areal structure (e.g., 
making national states responsible for enforcing international agreements on global 
warming); and, finally, addressing the multiformity of globalization processes by engaging in 
the struggle to define the rules for harmonizing or standardizing a wide range of 
technological, economic, juridico-political, socio-cultural, and environmental issues.  
More specifically, given the multicentric and multiform nature of globalization, some states 
are committed to promoting their own national or regional capitalisms and the appropriate 
conditions for the expanded reproduction of these forms of capitalism on a global scale. The 
neo-liberal project has, of course, been most successful in this regard in the past two 
decades; but it has not gone uncontested and the European model in particular may regain 
ground in the coming decade. They are also establishing new scales of activity (and 
dismantling others) and thereby rescaling and re-articulating various state powers, 
institutional forms, and regulatory capacities and creating the possibility for themselves and 
other actors to ‘jump scales’ in response to specific problems. They are promoting the space 
of flows by organizing conditions favourable to the international mobility of technologies, 
industrial and commercial capital, intellectual property, and at least some types of labour 
power. And, conversely, they are engaged in complementary forms of Standortpolitik and 
other forms of place-based competition in the attempt to fix mobile capital in their own 
economic spaces and to enhance the inter-urban, inter-regional, or international 
competitiveness of their own place-bound capitals. 
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6. Globalization, Time, and the State 
An important source of pressure on states comes from the growing complexity of the political 
economy of time and its implications for politics as the ‘art of the possible’. States 
increasingly face temporal pressures in their policy-making and implementation due to new 
forms of time-space distantiation, compression, and differentiation. For, as the temporalities 
of the economy accelerate relative to those of the state, the time to determine and co-
ordinate political responses to economic events shrinks – especially in relation to superfast 
and/or hypermobile capital. This reinforces conflicts between the time(s) of the state and the 
time(s) of the market. One solution to the state’s loss of time sovereignty is laissez-faire. This 
approach reinforces the temporality of deregulated exchange-value, however, which 
becomes problematic when market forces provoke economic crises and states are expected 
to respond. Two other options are for states to try to compress their own decision-making 
cycles so that they can make more timely and appropriate interventions and/or to attempt to 
decelerate the activities of ‘fast capitalism’ to match existing political routines.  
A strategy of temporal compression increases pressures to make decisions on the basis of 
unreliable information, insufficient consultation, lack of participation, etc., even as state 
managers believe that policy is still taking too long to negotiate, formulate, enact, adjudicate, 
determine, and implement. The commitment to ‘fast policy’ is reflected in the shortening of 
policy development cycles, fast-tracking decision-making, rapid programme rollout, 
continuing policy experimentation, institutional and policy Darwinism, and relentless revision 
of guidelines and benchmarks. This privileges those who can operate within compressed 
time scales, narrows the range of participants in the policy process, and limits the scope for 
deliberation, consultation, and negotiation. This can significantly affect the choice of policies, 
the initial targets of policy, the sites where policy is implemented, and the criteria adopted to 
demonstrate success. It also affects whether any lessons learnt are relevant to other targets, 
sites, or criteria; and it discourages proper evaluation of a policy’s impact over different 
spatio-temporal horizons, including delayed and/or unintended consequences and feedback 
effects. In such situations, ‘spin’ trumps substance and modifies the nature of politics and 
policy-making. It may also help to accelerate policy-making and implementation cycles so 
that different approaches are tried in rapid succession as each is seen to fail. One symptom 
of this is the shortening ‘half life’ of legislation and other policies (Scheuerman 2001: 91–2). It 
also produces the dilemma that unchanged policies become irrelevant or even 
counterproductive whilst constant changes in policies risk being seen as opportunistic or 
illegitimate (on the case of law, for example, see de Sousa Santos 1995).  
Even if fast policy appears irrational from a purely policy-making perspective, it may still be 
rational for some interests in politics- or polity-making terms. For fast policy is antagonistic to 
corporatism, stakeholding, the rule of law, formal bureaucracy, and, indeed, to the routines 
and cycles of democratic politics more generally. It privileges the executive over the 
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legislature and the judiciary, finance over industrial capital, consumption over long-term 
investment. In general, resort to fast policy undermines the power of decision-makers who 
have long decision-taking cycles – because they lose the capacity to make decisions in 
terms of their own routines and procedures, having to adapt to the speed of the fast policy 
takers. It also tends to destroy institutional memory, on the grounds that new circumstances 
require new approaches, and to block efforts to anticipate future difficulties and policy 
failures. Hence the present is extended at the expense of both past and future and politics is 
lived in the mediatized world of spin and presentation, the quick fix, rapid churning of 
policies, and plebiscitarian democracy (cf. Chesneaux 2000; Hoogerwoof 1990; Santiso and 
Schedler 1998; for a possible counter-argument that simplistic, short-term, populist ‘spin’ by 
a charismatic leader is a useful complement to – or front for – more complex, medium- to 
long-term, behind-the-scenes policy-making lobbying, negotiation, policy-making, see 
Grande 2000). 
An alternative strategy is not to compress absolute political time but to create relative 
political time by slowing the circuits of capital. Perhaps the most celebrated, if not yet 
implemented, example of this strategy is the Tobin tax, which would decelerate the flow of 
superfast and hypermobile financial capital and limit its distorting impact on the real economy 
(see Jetin and de Brunhoff 2000). Other examples include an energy tax on fossil fuels and 
nuclear power, consistent introduction of the polluter pays principle on a global scale, resort 
to a worldwide prudential principle in the introduction of new technologies, and inclusion of 
recycling and disposal costs in pricing goods (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999). For these could 
tilt the balance away from globalization in favour of regional and local economies, slow the 
rate of environmental destruction, and allow proper evaluation of the likely consequences of 
technological innovation. This could be supplemented by a fourth political time-management 
option. This is to establish the institutional framework for subsidiaritarian guided self-
regulation on various scales as well as for continuous monitoring of how well such self-
regulation is operating in the light of agreed criteria (Scheuerman 2001). This strategy of 
reflexive metagovernance would enable the state to retain the capacity to co-ordinate 
activities across different time zones and temporalities without the risk of overload 
(Hoogerwerf 1990). 
More generally, on the temporal front, states are getting involved in promoting new temporal 
horizons of action and new forms of temporal flexibility, in coping with the increased salience 
of multiple time zones (in commerce, diplomacy, security, etc.), in recalibrating and managing 
the intersection of temporalities (e.g., regulating computer-programmed trading, promoting 
the 24-hour city as centre of consumption, managing environmental risk), and socializing 
long-term conditions of production as short -term calculation becomes more important for 
marketized economic activities. Of particular importance is the restructuring of welfare 
regimes to promote flexible economic and social adjustment and socialize its costs as 
economies become more vulnerable to the cyclical fluctuations and other vagaries of the 
world market (Jessop 1999b, 1999c). Such a welfare orientation was always a feature of 
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small open economies but is now becoming more general. For, ‘[t]he more the welfare state 
is able to guarantee security and a “future” beyond the market place, the more political space 
there is to relax closure vis-a-vis world markets’ (Rieger and Leibfried, 1994: 368). 
7. Conclusions  
I will draw two sets of conclusions. The first set concerns globalization and time. I hope to 
have shown that globalization is not just a spatial or scalar phenomenon; it is also temporal. 
It is best studied in terms of differential articulation of time-space distantiation and time-
space compression and their repercussions on power relations and social dynamics. Indeed, 
insofar as globalization is linked to the logics of capital accumulation, time is more significant 
than space – because accumulation rests on ‘economy of time’. Global capitalism weakens 
national states through its adverse impact on their claims to time sovereignty as well as to 
territorial sovereignty. This suggests the need to reorganize the spatio-temporal fixes within 
which moments of relative structural coherence and stability can occur through the 
displacement and/or deferral of certain of the contradictions and dilemmas of capitalism 
beyond the spatio-temporal horizons with which that fix is associated. But it also means that 
there can never be global stability or an unlimited process of global accumulation in an 
undifferentiated world market. For spatio-temporal pockets of stable capital accumulation 
rests on specific spatio-temporal fixes. This is never a global stability – it is always 
spatialized, temporalized, and differential. This in turn implies that attempts to control the 
globalization of the capital relation entail control over its temporalities as well as its 
spatialities. As well as thinking global, acting local, we must also think glacial, act everyday. 
This brings me to the second set of conclusions, concerning the role of the state in 
constituting these socio-spatial fixes and managing the temporalities as well as spatialities of 
capital accumulation. The national state has long played a key role in establishing and 
regulating the relationship between the spatial and the temporal matrices of social life 
(Poulantzas, 1978: 114). This remains true in a period of globalization but the forms in which 
the state is involved therein have been changing. For the state is involved in modifying the 
spatio-temporal matrices of capitalism and the nation; and it has a key role in managing the 
uneven spatio-temporal development engendered by the capital relation. In many significant 
respects the processes that produce globalization have undermined the effectiveness of the 
national state (in its postwar forms) because specific powers and capacities have become 
less relevant to the new spatio-temporal matrices, the reversal of the relative significance of 
wages as cost of production and source of demand and of money as national money and 
international currency as these functioned in Atlantic Fordism, and the increased significance 
of competition and state forms as sites of contradictions and dilemmas in a globalizing, 
knowledge-driven economy (see Jessop 2002). Nonetheless a restructured national state 
remains central to the effective management of the emerging spatio-temporal matrices of 
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capitalism and the emerging forms of post- or transnational citizenship to be seen in multi-
ethnic, multicultural, melting pot, tribal, cosmopolitan, ‘playful’ postmodern, and other 
identities. For national states have become even more important arbiters of the movement of 
state powers upwards, downwards, and sideways; they have become even more important 
meta-governors of the increasingly complex multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, and 
multiform world of governance; and they are actively involved in shaping the forms of 
international policy regimes. They are also responding to the crisis in traditional forms and 
bases of national citizenship. Their activities in these respects have far less to do with 
globalization in the strongest sense of this polyvalent, promiscuous, and controversial word 
(i.e., the emergence of a borderless planetary economy – an entity widely and rightly 
regarded as mythical) than they do with the more general spatio-temporal restructuring of 
contemporary capitalism. This is why my own discussion of globalization has focused on the 
complex spatio-temporal logics of globalization and their manifold implications for state 
power. In doing so I hope to have contributed in a small way to demystifying globalization 
and illustrating the ways in which its associated spatio-temporal transformations can be 
modified and controlled. 
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